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The recession that started in 1990 seems mild by conventional 
measures. Between late 1990 and mid-1991, unemployment 
rose only half a percentage point; the value of total output, 
adjusted for inflation, fell only about half as much as it typ-
ically does during a recession; and the level of industrial pro-
duction fell only 3.7 percent, the smallest decline during any 
of the postwar recessions. But the economy does not seem to 
be bouncing back from this seemingly mild recession. Al-
though a recovery appeared to start in the third quarter of 
1991, as real output increased for the first time in nearly a 
year, the economy remains so weak that the current period of 
growth seems more like a malaise than a recovery. 
Why is the recovery so weak? Some analysts suggest that 
it must be weak simply because the recession was mild: 
Growth didn't fall far, so it doesn't have far to rise. But this 
view may be too optimistic about the long-run prospects for 
growth. Conventional measures of recession hide the fact that 
the economy has been growing quite slowly since 1989— 
long before the recession began. And there is very little evi-
dence that the economy will return to faster long-run growth 
in the near future. Without some boost assuring such growth, 
the weakness of the current recovery is easy to understand: 
The recovery is and will remain weak because the U.S. econ-
omy has entered an extended period of slow growth. 
A Long-Run Slowdown ... 
Although the recent recession seems mild by some measures, 
traditional ways of analyzing its severity mask the fact that 
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the U.S. economy has been growing very slowly for the past 
three years. 
A recession is traditionally defined as two or more consec-
utive quarters of declining real gross national product (GNP), 
the total value of all goods and services produced in the Unit-
ed States, adjusted for inflation. By this definition, the latest 
recession appears relatively short and mild. It seems to have 
lasted only three quarters, from the fourth quarter of 1990 to 
the second quarter of 1991, and during this time, real GNP 
fell only 1.2 percent. 
However, looking at traditionally defined recessions is not 
the only way to detect poor economic performance. Another 
way is to examine periods when real GNP grew more slowly 
than its average rate. We call such periods slowdowns. Chart 
1 shows the quarterly pattern of real GNP growth for the 
United States during the past 44 years. During that period, 
real GNP has grown at an average annual rate of about 3.2 
percent. Slowdowns can be seen on the chart by looking for 
those periods when growth remained below that rate. 
Chart 1 shows that the U.S. economy has been in a slow-
down since the second quarter of 1989. This is the longest 
slowdown since the end of World War II. It has lasted for at 
least ten quarters; no other slowdown lasted more than seven. 
Note that a slowdown can continue even during a recovery— 
which is probably happening now—as long as real GNP 
growth remains below average. 
But the length of the current slowdown is not the only 
measure of its severity. Another is its depth: the difference 
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between the current level of real GNP and the level it would 
have attained if it had grown at its average postwar rate dur-
ing each quarter since the slowdown started. 
In the third quarter of 1991, real GNP was 6.8 percent 
lower than it would have been had it grown at its average rate 
since the first quarter of 1989. This statistic gives a much 
bleaker picture of the economy's performance than the ob-
servation that real GNP fell only 1.2 percent during the re-
cession. In fact, by the measure of shortfall from average 
growth, the current slowdown is one of the three worst since 
1948. 
... Not Expected to End Soon 
The composition of the current slowdown suggests that slow 
growth will not end soon. A much larger than usual fraction 
of the current slowdown is accounted for by slow growth in 
consumer spending. Such a large slowdown in consumption 
growth may suggest that people expect continued slow eco-
nomic growth. 
Chart 2 compares the composition of the shortfall of real 
GNP from its average growth during the current slowdown to 
those during the typical postwar slowdown and during the 
Great Depression. During the typical recession, most of the 
GNP shortfall is accounted for by reductions in investment. 
Reduced consumption spending accounts for only about a 
quarter of the shortfall, even though consumption spending is 
almost two-thirds of GNP. 
Chart 1 
Growth in U.S. Output 
Quarterly Percentage Changes at Annual Rates in Gross National Product, 
Adjusted for Inflation, 1948:2-1991:3 
1950 1960 1970 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
1980  1990 
Chart 2 
The Composition of U.S. Slowdowns 
Percentage of the Drop in Real GNP From Its Average Growth 







Depression Postwar Slowdown 
Current 
Slowdown* 
*The current slowdown is measured here from the second quarter of 1989 through 
the fourth quarter of 1991. 
Source: Barro 1990, U.S. Department of Commerce 
During the current slowdown, however, consumption has 
accounted for a much larger fraction of the shortfall of real 
GNP from its average growth. In fact, over half of the short-
fall in real GNP can be attributed to slower consumption 
growth—a much larger share than during any of the other 
postwar slowdowns. Chart 2 shows that the consumer spend-
ing portion of the slowdown now looks much more like that 
during the Great Depression.
1 
Why is decreased consumption growth so much more sig-
nificant in the current slowdown than it was in other recent 
slowdowns? The permanent income hypothesis suggests one 
reason: people may be more pessimistic now about future eco-
nomic growth, and thus their long-term economic prospects, 
than they were during other recent slowdowns. 
The permanent income hypothesis states that people make 
consumption decisions based on the income they expect to 
make over their lifetimes, rather than on their current income. 
According to this hypothesis, a temporary decline in people's 
income will change their consumption relatively little: people 
will dig into their savings to consume, rather than drastically 
Of course, this comparison is not meant to imply that the current slowdown is 
anywhere near as serious as the Great Depression. Recall that in this slowdown, real 
GNP has fallen only 6.8 percent below its average growth; during the Great Depression, 
it fell 37.4 percent. 
19 reduce their consumption, because they expect the decline in 
their income to quickly be reversed. However, the theory 
says, if people expect a permanent decline in their income, or 
in their rate of income growth, they will scale back their con-
sumption plans more sharply because they realize that their 
current consumption plans are not sustainable. 
Thus, during the typical slowdown, people largely main-
tain their consumption plans because they do not expect their 
long-term prospects to change. However, in the current slow-
down—as was true in the Great Depression—people have 
scaled back their consumption plans substantially because 
they have become more pessimistic. This extended period of 
slowing consumption growth may indicate that people expect 
more-or-less permanently lower growth in their income. 
But if people expect an extended period of slow income 
growth, that necessarily implies that they expect long-run 
slow growth in GNP. Since GNP is the value of all goods 
and services produced in the country, it is also the value of all 
payments made for production of goods and services, and all 
payments made are received by someone as income.
2 Thus, 
there is a direct link between people's expectations about their 
own income and the nation's, or GNP. And according to the 
permanent income hypothesis, anytime consumers reduce 
their consumption growth over an extended period, they are 
showing pessimism about the growth of both personal income 
and GNP. 
An extended period of slow consumption growth is exactly 
what has happened recently. Consumers have been holding 
tightly to their wallets for some time now. In fact, over the 
last three years, consumer spending has grown at an annual 
rate of just 1 percent. Since 1948, only the economically trou-
bled years of 1980-82 had lower consumption growth than 
did 1989-91. 
Further, recent consumer surveys suggest that spending 
will not increase anytime soon. In November, the Conference 
Board's index of consumer expectations dropped to the depth 
it reached during the 1981-82 recession, and an ABC News-
Washington Post survey showed that more people planned to 
cut back their end-of-year holiday spending in 1991 than at 
the beginning of the recession in 1990. 
Justified Pessimism 
The three-year history of weak consumption growth and the 
current prospect for continued weakness suggest that people 
have been pessimistic about the economy since early in 1989 
and that they remain so late in 1991. Is this continued pessi-
mism reasonable? 
It may not be. Consumers could just be overreacting to re-
cent bad economic news. If they are overreacting, then a bit 
of good economic news could quickly eliminate their pessi-
mism. And if unreasonable pessimism is the cause of recent 
slow consumption growth, then slow consumption growth re-
ally doesn't tell us much about future economic conditions. So 
we need to see whether independent evidence about future 
economic conditions confirms or refutes the pessimistic views 
of consumers that may be embodied in recent slow consump-
tion growth. 
Several kinds of evidence confirm these views. 
Real Estate Prices 
Real estate prices provide a clear independent confirmation of 
pessimism about future economic growth. 
In general, the prices of real estate—especially office build-
ings and houses—provide some of the clearest evidence about 
future economic conditions. This is because the current price 
of any asset depends on what people think the asset will be 
worth in the future. For example, even if an office building is 
not very profitable today, its value will rise today if people 
suddenly expect that the building will become more profitable 
tomorrow. The opposite will happen if the prospects for the 
building's profitability suddenly plunge. 
The fact that real estate prices depend on people's expecta-
tions about the demand for real estate means that these prices 
indicate what people expect about economic conditions. If 
people expect decreased growth in the demand for commer-
cial real estate, they expect slower growth in overall economic 
activity. If people expect decreased growth in the demand for 
residential real estate, they expect a slowdown in the average 
person's ability to pay for housing, a slowdown linked to 
slower growth in real GNP. 
Unfortunately, real estate prices have fared quite badly in 
the past few years. Housing prices have collapsed in the 
Northeast and have stagnated or declined in most of the rest 
of the country. And commercial real estate prices have fallen 
even faster than housing prices. Since peaking in 1986, the 
average value of prime office properties has fallen more than 
one-third, and there is no end in sight to these declines.
3 
Of course, the price of commercial real estate is tied most 
directly to expectations for economic conditions: If expecta-
tions about businesses' needs for real estate and business in-
come are revised downward, the prices of commercial real 
estate naturally fall quickly. This seems to be exactly what has 
2Foreign capital ownership, both here and abroad, needs to be taken into account 
in computing the difference between the amount of GNP produced in the United States 
and the value of all income received by people in the United States. Payments to for-
eigners for ownership of U.S. capital are subtracted from GNP and payments to people 
in the United States for ownership of capital abroad are added to GNP to determine the 
value of all income received by people in the United States. However, this adjustment 
should have little effect on the relationship between the rate of growth of GNP and the 
rate of growth of income. 
3These data are from a survey by the Russell-National Council of Real Estate 
Investment Fiduciaries. The survey is based on rents and appraised values of about 350 
office properties owned by major institutional investors. 
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happened in the U.S. commercial real estate market in the last 
few years, and it provides another signal of slow growth 
ahead. 
Labor Force Facts 
Another indicator that is consistent with consumers' pessi-
mism is labor force data. These data show that rapid increases 
in total hours worked are unlikely to allow real GNP to in-
crease as quickly in the near future as it did in the 1980s. 
Real GNP growth, by definition, must come from growth 
in either the total number of hours people work or the amount 
they produce per hour worked (productivity). As Chart 3 
shows, during the past decade, most of the increase in real 
GNP was due to an increase in hours rather than productivity. 
Clearly, unless we know of some good reason to expect a 
substantial change in productivity, we should not rely on its 
growth to account for much GNP growth in the near future. 
If GNP growth must come primarily from increases in to-
tal hours worked, we must determine whether those increases 
are likely to be as large in the next few years as they were 
during the 1980s. The evidence says they're not. 
During the 1980s, hours worked increased both because of 
an increase in the size of the labor force and because of an 
increase in the average number of hours worked by each per-
son in the labor force. Charts 4 and 5 show the trends since 
1948 in labor force participation and hours worked per person 
in the labor force. Chart 4 shows that from 1983 to 1989, the 
fraction of the population in the labor force grew more than 
Chart 3 
Growth in U.S. Output and Hours Worked 
Percentage Changes From One Year Earlier, Quarterly, 1981:1-1991:3 
% 
10 
5 percent and reached a new postwar peak. The upswing in 
labor force participation over the past 25 years was largely the 
result of the entry of women and baby boomers into the labor 
force. Many observers believe that labor force participation by 
women has already peaked. And since all baby boomers are 
now at least 25 years old, few of them will be entering the 
labor force for the first time in the next few years. Labor 
force participation, therefore, is unlikely to increase as rapidly 
in the next few years as it did from 1983 to 1989. 
Chart 5 shows the other important source of growth in 
Charts 4 and 5 
U.S. Labor Force Trends 
Quarterly, 1948:1-1991:3 
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Chart 5 Hours Worked Per Person in the Labor Force* 
L  _L  _L  j 
Sources of basic data: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
1950 1960 1970 198 
*Annualized total hours worked per quarter + Labor force in the quarter. 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor 
1990 
21 total hours worked from 1983 to 1989: the average number 
of hours worked per labor force participant. This number in-
creased nearly 10 percent during those seven years. By 1990, 
it had reached its highest level in more than 15 years. And 
Chart 5 suggests that, even if average hours worked were to 
increase a bit, rapid growth is unlikely to resume. To begin 
with, the number is already extremely high. If average hours 
worked rose only 4.8 percent from its third quarter 1991 
level, it would be above its highest level in the postwar era. 
Besides that, recent opinion polls show that increased leisure 
time is a high priority for most Americans. This evidence 
strongly suggests that a large increase in average hours 
worked is qtiite unlikely in the next few years. 
Labor force data are consistent with the permanent income 
hypothesis. Together, the data and the theory can explain both 
the rapid consumption growth of the mid-1980s and its slow-
down recently. According to this analysis, peoples' estimates 
of their permanent income increased during the mid-1980s be-
cause they decided to work longer hours and because more of 
them decided to permanently enter the work force. As their 
permanent income increased, their consumption grew rapidly. 
In the 1990s, however, as people have come closer to the 
limits of their willingness to work more hours or to enter the 
work force, their estimates of permanent income are increas-
ing much more slowly. Therefore, consumption growth has 
fallen. 
If increases in labor force participation and average hours 
worked are unlikely to provide the same growth in total hours 
worked as in previous years, what could be the source of fu-
ture increases in total hours? Only one source remains: pop-
ulation growth. Yet few people believe that the U.S. popula-
tion will grow rapidly in the foreseeable future.
4 If that is 
right, and population growth must be the primary source for 
increases in total hours worked, then growth in real output 
over the next few years is likely to be very small. 
4Note that even if faster population growth from immigration causes GNP to rise 
faster, immigration would not affect per capita GNP. 
Table 1 
A BVAR Model's Forecast for the U.S. Economy in 1992-93* 
Actual** 
Model Forecast  1948-90 
Indicator  1991  1992  1993  Average 
Annual Growth Rates 
(4th Qtr. % Changes From Year Earlier) 
Real Gross National Product (GNP)  .1%  3.9%  4.0%  3.3% 
Consumer Spending  1.2  3.7  2.7  3.4 
Durable Goods  -2.2  6.6  1.4  5.1 
Nondurable Goods and Services  1.9  3.2  2.9  3.1 
Investment  2.7  6.5  6.1  3.8 
Business Fixed  -4.0  4.2  8.2  3.6 
Residential  3.6  10.8  1.5  3.7 
Government Purchases  -1.7  .9  1.9  3.9 
GNP Price Deflator  3.4  1.7  1.7  4.2 
Consumer Price Index  2.7  2.4  3.1  5.1 
4th Quarter Levels 
Change in Business Inventories (1982$)  3.8 bil.  8.2 bil.  6.7 bil.  16.4 bil 
Net Exports (1982$)  -33.4 bil.  -22.0 bil.  16.7 bil.  -14.6 bil 
(Exports Less Imports) 
Civilian Unemployment Rate  6.8%  6.6%  6.0%  5.6% 
(Unemployment as a % of the Civilian Labor Force) 
*This is the forecast of a Bayesian vector autoregression model using data available on December 12,1991. 
** Actual numbers for 1991 are estimates based on data available on December 12,1991. 
Sources of actual data: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
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A Model's Short-Run View 
A final confirmation of the view that recent slow consumption 
growth is a good indicator of future slow economic growth 
comes from the forecast of a statistical model used by re-
searchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
During the business cycle, real GNP typically grows at its 
fastest rate at the beginning of a recovery. So if we are to 
have any hope of getting out of the long-run slowdown soon, 
real GNP growth at the beginning of this recovery—over its 
first year or so—would have to be higher than its average rate 
during the past 44 years. 
The Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) model used 
at the Minneapolis Fed predicts that economic growth in 1992 
and 1993 will only be about average for the postwar era.
5 
Table 1 shows this model's forecast for several key economic 
variables, along with their estimated values for 1991 and their 
average values since 1948. The model predicts that real GNP 
will grow 3.9 percent between the fourth quarter of 1991 and 
the fourth quarter of 1992 and 4 percent during 1993, slightly 
more than the average annual GNP growth since 1948 of 3.3 
percent. Real growth in both consumer and government 
spending is expected to be weaker than average while invest-
ment spending is expected to be stronger than average. 
The model also forecasts, by the way, that inflation will 
remain under control over the next two years. It predicts that 
the consumer price index will increase at an annual rate of 2.4 
percent in 1992 and 3.1 percent in 1993 while the GNP price 
deflator increases at an annual rate of only 1.7 percent. 
Unfortunately, in Table 1, the outlook seems better than it 
is. Table 1 compares the forecast for each of the next two 
years to the economy's average performance since 1948. Be-
cause economic performance at the beginning of a recovery 
is usually stronger than average, the appropriate comparison 
here is between the model's forecast for the first year of this 
recovery and the economy's actual performance at the begin-
ning of previous recoveries. 
Table 2 shows just such a comparison. As we saw in 
Table 1, the BVAR model predicts that the recovery that 
seems to have begun in the third quarter of 1991 will contin-
ue through the next two years. But at the same time, as we 
can see in Table 2, the model predicts that the economy's 
performance will be much weaker during the first year of this 
recovery than it was during the first year of recoveries in the 
postwar era. Growth in real GNP is predicted to be only 2.8 
percent during the first year of this recovery, roughly half of 
the average first-year growth.
6 
Table 2 also shows that the model expects relatively little 
stimulus at the start of this recovery from three usual sources: 
durable goods consumption, investment, and government 
spending. 
Durable goods consumption is predicted to grow at an 
Table 2 
Another Look at the Model's Forecast 
% Changes From One Year Earlier at the End of the First Year of Recovery 
Actual Average 
Predicted in in Postwar 
Indicator This Recovery* Recoveries 
Real Gross National Product  2.8%  6.1% 
Consumer Spending  3.0  4.6 
Durable Goods  5.3  14.3 
Nondurable Goods and Services  2.6  3.4 
Investment  11.4  22.1 
Business Fixed  .9  10.4 
Residential  17.4  15.7 
Government Purchases  -1.7  4.4 
Industrial Production  2.2  11.1 
Employment  .3  4.2 
Real Personal Income  2.5  5.0 
The first year of this recovery is from the end of the second quarter of 1991 through the second quarter 
of 1992. The period after the third quarter of 1991 is predicted by a Bayesian vector autoregression 
model using data available on December 12,1991. 
Sources of basic data: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor, 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
annual rate of only 5.3 percent during the first year of this 
recovery, only about a third of its average first-year value. 
This modest prediction is easy to understand, given the mod-
el's concurrent predictions for growth in employment and 
personal income. (See Table 2.) Employment is predicted to 
grow only three-tenths of a percent during the first year of 
this recovery, which is less than a tenth of its average growth. 
And personal income, adjusted for inflation, is predicted to 
grow only half as much as usual. 
Investment spending is predicted to grow at about half the 
rate typical at the beginning of a recovery. Business invest-
ment in buildings and equipment is predicted to be especially 
weak for this stage of the business cycle. The depressed con-
dition of the commercial real estate market has caused the 
model to predict that business investment in buildings will fall 
5For background on BVAR models like this one, see Litterman 1984 and Todd 
1984. 
6Some economists would prefer to compare the forecast that the model would have 
made at the beginning of other recoveries to its current forecast, instead of comparing 
actual recoveries to the current forecast. But data limitations in the model prevent such 
a comparison before 1970. However, the model's forecast of real GNP growth for the 
first year of this recovery is below the average forecast it would have made at the be-
ginning of the last four recoveries: 4.6 percent growth. 
23 15 percent during the first year of the recovery. Since invest-
ment in equipment is usually closely linked to durable goods 
consumption, the growth of spending on equipment is also 
predicted to be below average for the beginning of a recovery. 
Government spending, meanwhile, though typically a sig-
nificant recovery booster, is actually predicted to fall during 
the first year of this recovery. Of course, that prediction won't 
surprise anyone who has paid attention to the fiscal plight of 
governments at every level. States and localities are cutting 
spending across the board because revenues have fallen so 
much faster than projected. 
It is difficult to look at Table 2 and come up with a 
convincing argument that this recovery will begin with a 
bang. The absence of strong stimulus from the usual sources 
suggests that we should not expect an end to slow economic 
growth anytime soon. Thus, consumers' unwillingness to 
spend and their gloom in sentiment surveys seem justified. 
In fact, this poor short-run outlook may actually be too 
optimistic. Recent economic data show considerable weak-
ness, and enough uncertainty remains about the model's fore-
cast that there is a significant chance that the economy could 
head back into recession during the fourth quarter of 1991. 
That is, we may have a double-dip recession. 
Although real growth in the third quarter of 1991 was 
moderately strong, much of the economic data for October 
and November show renewed weakness. Employment fell 
sharply in November, after lackluster growth in September 
and October, and initial claims for unemployment insurance 
in November hit their highest level since May. Retail sales 
fell in October, and sales of new cars and trucks fell sharply 
throughout October and into early November. Industrial pro-
duction did not grow at all in October and fell sharply in No-
vember. Growth in M2, the most-watched monetary aggre-
gate, has been extremely low since July. And most measures 
of consumer confidence have fallen rapidly between Septem-
ber and December; these sorts of declines have never hap-
pened during a recovery. All of these indicators suggest that 
the recession may not be over yet. 
A double-dip recession—continued recession after one 
quarter of growth in real GNP—would not be unusual. Five 
of the past eight recessions have paused for just one quarter 
of positive real GNP growth. So the fact that there was pos-
itive real GNP growth in the third quarter of 1991 does not 
ensure that the recession is over. 
The BVAR model can help us estimate the probability of 
continued recession. One of the model's important features is 
that it can objectively quantify the amount of uncertainty in 
its own forecast using the record of its past errors. In this 
way, the model can simulate the likely range of its future 
errors. And since the model can quantify the amount of un-
certainty in its forecast, it can also compute the probability 
that a quantifiable economic event will occur. For example, 
the model can compute the probability of at least one quarter 
of declining real GNP during the next year. Given all it 
knows now, the model estimates the probability of that event 
as 46 percent. 
Unjustified Optimism 
Of course, if there is enough uncertainty about growth being 
much worse than predicted, growth could also be much better 
than predicted. And the stock market rally at the end of 1991 
suggests that quite a few people are now betting on faster 
growth. However, identifying potential sources of rapid 
growth is difficult. 
Some think a boost will come from the labor force. These 
analysts claim that the slow productivity growth of the 1970s 
and 1980s was caused by the entry of inexperienced workers 
into the labor force, so productivity will soon rise as the labor 
force gets more job experience. That productivity growth 
would cause faster growth in real GNP But there is little firm 
evidence to support this view. So our best guess must be that 
slow economic growth will continue for some time to come. 
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